Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy Dataset

Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) find that the share of the unofficial economy in GDP is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post-communist economies. Exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the OECD, Latin America, and transition economies, we find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of GDP when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker. While these findings are consistent with the earlier results for transition economies, in the larger country sample we find it is not necessarily the case that more regulation or higher taxes directly increases the size of the unofficial economy. The problem appears to be not regulation or taxation per se, but whether the state administrative system can operate without corruption. A high level of regulatory discretion helps create the potential for corruption and drive firms into the unofficial economy.

This file contains the data set used in the above mentioned paper. It includes different measures of regulation, taxation, legal environment, and corruption, and it covers about 50 countries over the period mid-1990s. Please refer to the readme file for a more detailed description. The data file is in coma delimited format.

Type: 
Other
Topics: 
Macroeconomic and Structural Policies
Economy Coverage: 
Economy Coverage not specified
Languages Supported: 
English
Geographical Coverage: 
Region/Country not specified
Access Options:
Download

Update Frequency

Update Frequency: 
No further updates planned
Release Date: 
July 1, 1998

Last Updated

Last Updated: 
July 1, 1998

No Visualizations Available.

Kaufman, Daniel and Simon Johnson and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. "Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy", American Economic Review (1998)

Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) find that the share of the unofficial economy in GDP is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post-communist economies. Exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the OECD, Latin America, and transition economies, we find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of GDP when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker. While these findings are consistent with the earlier results for transition economies, in the larger country sample we find it is not necessarily the case that more regulation or higher taxes directly increases the size of the unofficial economy. The problem appears to be not regulation or taxation per se, but whether the state administrative system can operate without corruption. A high level of regulatory discretion helps create the potential for corruption and drive firms into the unofficial economy.

This file contains the data set used in the above mentioned paper. It includes different measures of regulation, taxation, legal environment, and corruption, and it covers about 50 countries over the period mid-1990s. Please refer to the readme file for a more detailed description. The data file is in coma delimited format.

Data Resources

Dataset Info

These fields are compatible with DCAT, an RDF vocabulary designed to facilitate interoperability between data catalogs published on the Web.
FieldValue
Modified Date
2018-04-19
Release Date
December 31,1969
Periodicity
Periodicity not specified
Identifier
7dc2b3fc-8089-4d27-9642-d7c2255c716e
License
License Not Specified
Rating: 
0
No votes yet
Type: 
Languages Supported: 
Economy Coverage: 
Update Frequency: 
Geographical Coverage: 
Data Classification of a Dataset: 
Release Date: 
Wednesday, July 1, 1998
Last Updated Date: 
Wednesday, July 1, 1998
Citation Text: 
Kaufman, Daniel and Simon Johnson and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. "Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy", American Economic Review (1998)
Modified date: 
10407
Primary Dataset: 
Yes

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